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In May 1992, I led a delegation of seven American environmental lawyers to the People’s 
Republic of China to consult on the Three Gorges Dam. Ground had not yet been broken for the 
dam; today it towers 175 meters (540 feet) above the bed of the Yangtze River and creates a res-
ervoir that is nearly filled—some 15 meters (47 feet) deep 500 kilometers (312 miles) upstream 
of the dam, making the dam is the largest in the world.1 We (the delegation) were going both to 
learn about the dam and to provide insights about the project drawn from our legal experience. 
About a month before we arrived, the delegation lost significance when the National People’s 
Congress voted to authorized the dam and by the time we arrived at the dam site (after meetings 
in Beijing), preliminary work had begun that would lead to the breaking of ground a few weeks 
later. It was apparent from the beginning that our function was to help justify the project by re-
porting that it would be compatible with a healthy environment. We were a disappointment to 
our hosts because we came away deeply skeptical of the project and said so in our report. We 
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were not alone.2 Unmentioned by our hosts was that the project had encountered major public 
resistance locally and nationally and that more than 600 members of the congress (out of more 
than 5,000 members) voted against the project.3 This was the first time since the crushing of dis-
sent in Tiananmen Square in 1989 that anyone in the Congress had voted against a government 
proposal—and only government proposals came before the congress. In our travels, we found 
many ordinary people willing to speak publicly of their opposition to the dam in the region 
where the project was to be built. Yet nothing short of the collapse of the Communist system 
could have stopped the project and that did not happen in China. But the willingness of people to 
take risks to express their concerns about the environment in such a climate of extreme repres-
sion led me to wonder what role, if any, such concerns played in the then recent collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The answer, it turned out, was quite a bit. 
I. COMMUNISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST EDIFICE 
Twenty years ago, the opening (and eventual destruction) of the Berlin Wall signaled the 
collapse of the edifice of Communism constructed over the preceding three-quarters of a century 
from Berlin to Pyongyang and from Murmansk to Addis Ababa. Much of twentieth-century his-
tory is about the rise of Communism, a revolutionary force that promised to remake human soci-
ety on a global scale. Yet suddenly, between 1989 and 1991, all of the Communist states in Eu-
rope collapsed, as well as some Communist states in Asia and Africa, while most of the surviv-
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ing Communist states largely abandoned Communist economic systems. While the crumbling 
edifice did not utterly collapse in Eastern Europe for another two years, and still hangs on, at 
least in vestigial forms, in some parts of the world, the collapse of the wall serves as an apt me-
taphor for the destruction of that edifice.  
The two years between 1989 and 1991 saw the long-cherished Communist dream fulfilled—
a proletarian workers’ revolt that spread from country to country to topple an exploitive eco-
nomic and political system, ironically directed at the world’s Communist governments rather 
than their opponents.4 The twentieth anniversary of the beginning of this process has produced a 
spate of books giving varied accounts of this collapse.5 These and other authors have focused 
their attention on the more immediately dramatic features of the collapse—the impact of the Pol-
ish Pope and the rise of Solidarnosc in Poland, the personality of Mickail Gorbachev leading him 
to launch perestroika and glasnost, the opening of the Hungarian border to allow thousands of 
East Germans to pass through Austria to West Germany, open resistance to Soviet rule in the 
Baltic Soviet republics, Gorbachev’s refusal to use the Red Army to maintain eastern European 
governments, the rise of Boris Yeltsin as a product of glasnost, and the attempted coup in Mos-
cow in 1991. Furthermore, the experience of Communism varied significantly from place to 
place. For example, in Russia and Ethiopia, where Communism collapsed completely, and 
China, Cuba, and Vietnam, where Communism did not altogether collapse, Communism was an 
indigenous force bound up with nationalism as much as it was in the working out of a universal 
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REVOLUTIONARY LEGACY OF 1989 (Jeffrey A. Engel ed. 2009). 
ideal. In Afghanistan, the non-Russian parts of the USSR, and the eight “captive” nations of 
Eastern Europe, Communism was an alien force imposed by foreign arms on unwilling people. 
Despite these central differences between Communist regimes, however, certain common themes 
appear in accounts of the final years of the formerly Communist nations (except perhaps Ethio-
pia). The most common theme, in both scholarly and popular accounts, is the growing yearning 
for democracy and human rights, as well as the desire for higher standards of living.6  
While these various features are intertwined in somewhat different ways in the several na-
tions, they do not themselves form an adequate explanation in any nation. Thus while national-
ism as well as yearning for democracy produced an uprising in Hungary (1956), reform in Cze-
choslovakia (1968), and repeated unrest in Poland (1956, 1970, 1976, 1980), none of these suc-
ceeded and other Eastern European Communist governments confronted no such unrest.7 During 
this time, there is remarkably little evidence of widespread popular yearning for either democ-
racy or human rights within the Soviet bloc. Black markets throughout Eastern Europe and the 
USSR focusing on blue jeans and rock-n-roll hardly supply such evidence.8 Such dissatisfaction 
as there was came from the growing realization among workers that their efforts were accom-
plishing little and earning them less. This realization was expressed in the oft-repeated joke 
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8 See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 6, at 24-25, 38, 41-42 (discussing the prevalence of a “shadow economy”—a black 
market—in all Communist societies). 
among workers that they had a deal with the government: “We pretend to work, and they pretend 
to pay us.”9 
Only after the dissolution of Communism was well underway did popular unrest begin to 
threaten the system. Even in Poland, persistent attempts to create space for open opposition to 
the Communist government largely failed until near the end of the system. Attempts to create 
“civil society,” primarily through the creation of “Helsinki watch groups,” are simply not enough 
to explain why Communism so suddenly collapsed.10 Such an explanation seems to leave at least 
one aspect of the collapse missing—why then? The Communist governments had functioned for 
decades without serious internal or external challenge, and there was no obvious reason why they 
couldn’t continue along the same path for decades more. Something had to crystallize the senti-
ment that the regimes not only had to go but could be overthrown.  
In many of these countries, the something more turned out to be the environment. Commu-
nism had a dismal record on the environment.11 By 1989, sulfurous skies were killing people 
across the Soviet bloc. Single Russian factories were producing more pollution than all of Scan-
dinavia.12 Immediately after the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation classified one-
sixth of its territory as uninhabitable because of pollution—yet the inhabitants had nowhere to 
go.13 Rivers were poisoned beyond anything found in western countries,14 while Lake Baikal 
                                                            
9 See, e.g., MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER 
SIEGE 216 (1993). I heard this joke repeatedly when I lived for a year in the People’s Republic of China before the 
market reforms took hold there, and I also heard it on visits to several Communist countries in Europe. 
10 See, e.g., Michael Bernhard, Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East-Central Europe, 108 POL. SCI. Q. 
307 (1993). 
11 FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 9; BARBARA JANCAR, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION 
AND YUGOSLAVIA: STRUCTURE AND REGULATION IN FEDERAL COMMUNIST STATES (1987); D.J. PETERSON, TROU-
BLED LANDS: THE LEGACY OF SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION (1993); PHILIP R. PRYDE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION (1991); THE SOVIET ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS, POLICIES AND POLITICS (John 
Massey Stewart ed. 1992); CHARLES ZIEGLER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE USSR (1987). 
12 Michael Specter, Far North in Russia: The Mine’s Fatal Blight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994, at A1. 
13 Jonathan D. Oldfield & Denis J.B. Shaw, The State of the Environment in the CIS, in EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND 
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 173, 175 (David Turnock ed. 2001); Sergei Zalygin, A 
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had become a paradigm of how not to manage a precious natural resource.15 The Aral Sea, in 
Central Asia, had become the prime example of “ecocide.”16  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Communism performed so conspicuously poorly regarding the environment for six reasons. 
First, Marxism carried forward the western tradition of treating nature solely as providing re-
sources for human consumption. As Vaclav Havel explained, Marxism saw humans as the “pro-
ductive force” and nature as a “production tool,” destroying the necessarily intimate relationship 
between the two.17 This concept was succinctly captured in the “labor theory of value” that de-
nied economic value to natural resources as such when consumed in productive processes be-
cause no human labor was expended in creating the natural resources.18 A second feature of 
Marxism reinforced the effect of the labor theory of value—its denial of individual responsibil-
ity. As a result, no one felt responsibility for the natural environment, leading to reckless disre-
gard of environmental consequences.19 Thirdly, the socialist goal of “transforming the world” 
led easily to “gigantomania”—a desire for the largest and most grandiose technological feats.20 
Gigantomania is also found in western countries, but structural features of Communism pre-
vented effective counter-pressure that, at least sometimes, stopped some of the most substantial 
14 FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 9, at 122. 
15 ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 55-59. The Russian government has been more protective of Lake Baikal in recent 
years. Steven Lee Myers, Putin Reroutes Oil Line to Avoid Landmark Lake, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at A8.  
16 BRANCO BOSNJAKOVIC, NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER-RELATED AGREEMENTS 16–
18, 24–25, 41–42 (2003) (UNESCO doc. SC-2003/WS/45); VIKTOR DUKHOVNYR & VADIM SOKOLOV, LESSONS ON 
COOPERATION BUILDING TO MANAGE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE ARAL SEA BASIN (2003) (UNESCO doc. SC-
2003/WS/44); STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES 
260-65 (2001); PRYDE, supra note 11, at 221-22.  
17 Tamara Raye Crockett & Cynthia B. Schultz, Environmental Protection Issues in Eastern Europe, BNA INT’L 
ENVT. RPTR., June 13, 1990, at 258. See also ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 39-44; Douglas Lind, The Crane, the 
Swamp, and the Melancholy: Nature and Nihilism in Soviet Environmental Literature and Law, 23 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 381 (2009). 
18 CZECH MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC: EVOLUTION, SITUATIONS, AND 
TRENDS TO THE END OF 1989, at 11-12 (1990); ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 161; Vladimir Kotov, Russia: The His-
torical Dimensions of Water Management, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 139, 143 (Jo-
seph W. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds. 2009); Peter B. Maggs, Marxism and Soviet Environmental Law, 23 CO-
LUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 353, 359-60 (1985). 
19 ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 46. 
20 Id. at 24; Zalygin, supra note 13, at 635. 
excesses in the west.21 This introduces a fourth factor—structural features rooted in Marxist ide-
ology and the conspiratorial nature of Communism’s rise to power—that are perhaps the most 
important. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” brooked no countervailing power centers.22 The 
Communist obsession with secrecy often kept problems hidden from both the public and the cen-
tral authorities until catastrophe made the problem obvious to all.23 Fifth, the determination to 
keep environmental problems secret was reinforced by the belief that such problems could not 
arise under Communism, which, after all, represented the most progressive ordering of society 
and the economy; to admit to environmental failings was to admit that Communism had failed in 
at least one important respect.24 Finally, there was the importance of “fulfilling the plan.” Suc-
cess and promotion for officials—and all major economic decisions were made by officials—
came only from fulfilling the plan, which generally was measured solely through quantitative 
achievements, resulting in pervasive poor quality production.25 New construction is what the 
plan called for, not maintenance, while cost, in any rational sense, simply was not a factor.26 The 
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46-47. 
24 CZECH MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 18, at 18-19. See also Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, 
Environmental Reforms in Post-Communist Central Europe, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 921, 926 (1992); Maggs, supra 
note 18, at 368-70; J. Cameron Thurber, Will Retrocession to a Communist Sovereign Have a Detrimental Effect on 
the Emphasis and Enforcement of Laws Protecting Hong Kong’s Environment? The Czech Experience as a Contra-
position, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 39, 41-42 (2001). 
25 See ZIEGLER, supra note 11, at 154. For more extended and nuanced discussions of the shortcomings of Commu-
nist-style economic planning, see John H. Moore, Agency Costs, Technological Change, and Soviet Central Plan-
ning, 24 J.L. & ECON. 189 (1981); Stephan, supra note 6, at 31-33. 
26 Galambos, supra note 23, at 209, 217; Mark Mininberg et al., Promoting Economic Growth and Environmental 
Protection: The Institute for Sustainable Development, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 69, 71 (1993); Nicholas A. Robinson, 
Perestroika and Priroda: Environmental Protection in the USSR, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 359-62 (1988). See 
generally Stephan, supra note 6, at 26. 
result, as a friend in China commented to me while I was living there before the market reforms, 
is that “They build old buildings here.” That comment could just as well be applied across East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union.27  
                                                           
Communism itself may have looked like an old building in 1986, but it also looked like a 
sturdily built building that would stand a long time. With the environment in such a problematic 
state, and structural and ideological problems precluding effective responses within a Communist 
system, it would have been remarkable if environmental problems did not play a major role in 
bringing down the system. In fact, a major environmental disaster on such a scale and in such a 
place that it could not be hidden precipitated a crippling crisis in the USSR itself when it became 
clear that the government could not cope. The crisis discredited the government and emboldened 
its critics so much that it could not survive. The structure of dissent in the Soviet bloc, such as it 
was, further ensured that environmental concerns would be central to the rhetoric, if not perhaps 
the real reasons, for the toppling of the Communist governments. 
Moderately large “green” movements with a modest degree of independence had been toler-
ated as a sort of window dressing for the official power structure. These groups, rather than the 
“forums” created to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Accords or to agitate for democracy or 
human rights, formed the organizational core for the toppling of the Communist governments. 
The toppling of some governments after an environmental crisis in turn weakened neighboring 
Communist governments, again often with environmental groups leading the way. Yet the role of 
the environment (and more pointedly, of environmentalism) in bringing Communism to an end 
in Europe has largely escaped notice.28 
 
27 See Stephan, supra note 6, at 35. 
28 See, e.g., F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE, RUSSIAN LAW: THE END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAW (1993); 
Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1991). 
II. CHERNOBYL OPENS A CRACK IN THE EDIFICE 
The old building created by the Communist system crumbled in most of the nations included 
within its walls in the five years following the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Dissidence only bare-
ly survived in the USSR before the Chernobyl nuclear accident.29 The “Helsinki Watch” and 
other over dissident groups were repressed; an officially sponsored “peace movement” was kept 
under tight party control despite growing public unhappiness over the Afghanistan adventure. 
The Soviet and party authorities allowed a modest degree of independence only for the environ-
mentalist movement.30 There were several reasons for relative tolerance of the “Greens.”31 First, 
most “Greens” were not ideological enemies of Marxism; many considered capitalism as neces-
sarily worse for the environment than socialism or communism. Second, the Greens provided 
important information that would not otherwise reach the “Center” given the increasingly perva-
sive misinformation being passed up by the apparatchiki. Third, the “Greens” provided proof of 
“Soviet democracy” in action. Finally, “Greens” tended to be disaffected individuals who were 
isolated in temperament and thought from the mass of the people and thus could not present a 
real challenge to the regime. The last reason was perhaps the most important. 
The USSR had had several nuclear accidents before Chernobyl, but they were in remote ar-
eas during periods of tight control of information and remained nothing more than unverified 
rumor for most people in the country.32 In April 1986, however, the Chernobyl accident occurred 
in the middle of large populations and near the power centers of the USSR. State control, more-
over, was loosening, President Gorbachev having launched perestroika (the restructuring of the 
                                                            
29 Bernhard, supra note 10, at 311-12. 
30 Oleg Yanitsky, Environmental Initiatives in Russia: East-West Comparisons, in ENVIRONMENT AND DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION, supra note 23, at 120, 130-32. 
31 Daniel H. Cole, Marxism and the Failure of Environmental Protection in Eastern Europe and the USSR, 17 LEG. 
STUDIES F. 35, 54-58 (1993). 
32 Sergei P. Kapitza, Lessons of Chernobyl: The Cultural Causes of the Meltdown, 72 FOR. AFF. no. 3, at 7, 7-8 
(May/June 1993). 
economy). In this setting, the more perceptive members of the nomenklatura realized immedi-
ately that Chernobyl would be the end of the regime. For example, Marshall Sergei Akhromeev 
(who committed suicide after the failure of the 1991 military coup) would comment, “The two 
most memorable days of my life were when I learned of the German invasion in 1941 and the 
day of the Chernobyl explosion. It was already clear to me how dreadful the consequences 
were.”33 He realized the enormity of the challenge to the system because the Chernobyl disaster 
was on such a scale that ordinary Soviet citizens could not ignore the utter failure of the re-
gime.34 
Millions lived with the areas subject to irradiation, which included the largest cities in Bela-
rus (Minsk) (about 160 km, 100 mi., away) and Ukraine (Kiyev—only 110 km., 68 mi., away). 
Costs of food within the region rose sharply because radiation rendered food grown nearby un-
safe. The government actually kept agriculture in those regions in production, but put the result-
ing food into long-term storage because it was too radioactive to be consumed. Eventually, the 
government would mix stored meat from the region with safe meat from elsewhere at a ratio of 
1:10 to make sausages and then would disperse the sausages around the country to prevent an 
“undesirable accumulation” of radioactivity in particular populations. The Soviet Minister of 
Health even advised people to breathe less in order to live longer.35 The Soviet government even 
proved incapable of furnishing adequate protection to workers sent to repair and restore the site, 
or to provide adequate medical care for those sickened by radiation.36 In an effort to conceal 
their failures, officials reclassified the amount of “acceptable radiation exposure” to a level 50 
                                                            
33 Not Just a Nuclear Explosion, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1991, at 19. 
34 GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, NO BREATHING ROOM: THE AFTERMATH OF CHERNOBYL (Evelyn Rossiter trans. 1993); 
GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL (Evelyn Rossiter trans. 1992). 
35 FESHBACH & FRIENDLY, supra note 9, at 260. 
36 Nell McAfferty, Life after Chernobyl, AUDUBON MAG., May-June 1996, at 86; Steven Lee Myers, First at Cher-
nobyl, Burning Still, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at A8; Vladimir Novokshchenov, The Chernobyl Problem, CIVIL 
ENGINEERING, MAY 2002, AT 74. 
times higher than its pre-Chernobyl standard, as secret records disclosed after the end of the 
USSR.37 
One can easily imagine how politically corrosive the public realization of such failings by 
any government would be. Consider the panic and suspicion generated by the comparatively 
mild Three Mile Island incident in the United States.38 In the USSR, the corrosive effect of the 
accident was exacerbated by the deliberate, but ultimately futile, government policy of covering 
up facts, coupled with the already pervasive distrust of the news media such that when the gov-
ernment began to tell the truth, nearly everyone assumed that the reality must be worse.39 Glas-
nost (“openness,” referring to the open flow of information) was little more than talk in early 
1986.40 Perhaps this talk was motivated by a sense that the USSR was falling behind the West in 
technological innovation and that state planning was breaking down due to the misinformation 
being passed up by appartchiki, reinforced by the emergence of a competitive model for Com-
munism in China’s nascent reforms. Yet Gorbachev’s first real break the Soviet tradition of strict 
control of information was his reversal of the initial policies of restricting public knowledge re-
garding Chernobyl.41 This came 18 days after the accident, signaling to the Soviet press that “old 
habits were no longer good enough.”42 Yet various authorities continued to attempt to cover up 
                                                            
37 Not Just a Nuclear Explosion, supra note 33. 
38 See, e.g., GREG ADAMSON, WE ALL LIVE ON THREE MILE ISLAND: THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER (1981); 
ROBERT DEL TREDICI, PEOPLE OF THREE MILE ISLAND (1980); DANIEL F. FORD, THREE MILE ISLAND: THIRTY MIN-
UTES TO MELTDOWN (1982); RAYMOND L. GOLDSTEEN & JOHN K. SCHORR, DEMANDING DEMOCRACY AFTER THREE 
MILE ISLAND (1991); MIKE GRAY & IRA ROSEN: WARNING: ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND (1982); CHRISTO-
PHER LAMPTON, NUCLEAR  ACCIDENT (1992); PETER S. HOUTS et al., THREE MILE ISLAND CRISIS: PSYCHOLOGICAL, 
SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON THE SURROUNDING POPULATION (1988); DANIEL MARTIN, THREE MILE IS-
LAND: PROLOGUE OR EPILOGUE? (1980); JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND (1994); MARK STEPHENS, THREE MILE ISLAND (1980); EDWARD J. 
WALSH, DEMOCRACY IN THE SHADOWS: CITIZEN MOBILIZATION IN THE WAKE OF THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE 
ISLAND (1988). 
39 Not Just a Nuclear Explosion, supra note 33. 
40 FELDBRUGGE, supra note 28, at 51-54. 
41 THE CRISIS OF LENINISM, supra note 6, at 13. 
42 Not Just a Nuclear Explosion, supra note 33. 
the extent of the disaster, only serving to further discredit the regime as Western broadcasts and 
refugees from the area spread the word.43 
In the wake of these failings, large-scale public criticism of the Soviet state and its policies 
emerged for the first time, within the Supreme Soviet and on the street.44 The increasing flow 
information finally forced the government to admit that its “first-generation” of nuclear power 
reactors did not meet “modern safety standards,” causing the Ministry of Atomic Power to order 
such reactors to be run at 70% of capacity.45 Eventually, the Russian Academy of Sciences rec-
ommended that these reactors be shut down. The government’s evident failures empowered its 
critics to speak out about other ecological disasters in the USSR. This movement spread rapidly 
in the non-Russian republics where it mingled with re-emergent nationalisms.46 The relatively 
tolerated environmental groups provided cover for those who might actually have been more in-
terested in nationalism or other matters. Criticism grew more slowly in Russia itself, perhaps be-
cause the ethnic Russians were responsible for the errors of industrialization in the USSR. 
The reaction was particularly intense in Belarus and Ukraine, two Soviet republics in which 
the sense of separate nationhood had been most thoroughly repressed before Chernobyl.47 An 
independence group, Rukh, was formed in Ukraine within weeks of Chernobyl. As Sergei Oda-
rich, the founding Secretary-General of Rukh, commented, “Chernobyl helped us to understand 
                                                            
43 Oleg S. Kolbasov, Ecological Disaster Area: The Chernobyl Case Study, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 637, 637-
38 (1992). 
44 Fear that the U.S. government was covering up the details of the Three Mile Island accident led to similar susp-
cions and to calls for greater “democracy” there as well, although with far less impact except on the nuclear power 
industry. See GOLDSTEEN & SCHORR, supra note 38; WALSH, supra note 38. 
45 Kathleen Maloney-Dunn, Russia’s Nuclear Waste Law: A Response to the Legacy of Environmental Abuse in the 
Former Soviet Union, 10 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365, 398 (1993). 
46 HÉLÈNE CARRERE D’ENCAUSSE, THE END OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE: THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONS (1992); István Deák, 
Uncovering Eastern Europe’s Dark Secret, 34 ORBIS 51 (1990); Marshall I. Goldman, Environmentalism and Ethnic 
Awaking, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511 (1992); Stephan, supra note 6, at 37-38. 
47 See DAVID R. MARPLES, BELARUS: A DENATIONALIZED NATION (1999); DAVID R. MARPLES, STALINISM IN THE 
UKRAINE (1992). 
that we were a colony.”48 The first act of resurrected Ukrainian nationalism (in 1991, while 
Ukraine was still in the USSR) was the local Supreme Soviet’s enactment of a law on “The Le-
gal Administration of Territories Contaminated with Radionucleides as a Result of the Chernobyl 
Disaster.”49 Even local Communists in the Ukraine joined in the criticism in order to ensure their 
political survival when the “Center” fell. In Belarus, the reaction was slower, yet the Belarusian 
delegates to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (almost all old-line Communists) took the lead in 
seeking an investigation of the handling of Chernobyl. When a wave of coal-mine strikes in 1991 
reached Belarus, the strikers used their time on television to discuss Chernobyl and to demand 
the resignation of the President and Supreme Soviet of the USSR rather than the economic issues 
featured elsewhere in the Union.50 The discrediting of the Soviet regime continued after the end 
of the Communist regime when its records, on Chernobyl and other ecological disasters, became 
public.51 
III. THE GABČIKOVO-NAGYMAROS DAM: WALLS CRUMBLE FROM THE EDIFICE 
Neither the Soviet government nor the long-troubled Polish government was the first Com-
munist regime to fall. That honor goes to the Communist government in Hungary, perhaps best 
symbolized by the decision to tear down the barbed wire along the Austrian border on May 2, 
1989.52 At about the same time, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (the Communists) ousted 
Janos Kadar, the party’s Secretary-General since the failed 1956 revolution, and embarked on a 
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broad program of reform that led to the regime’s collapse.53 Hungary technically was then ruled 
by a “coalition” of allied parties under the “leadership” of the Socialist Workers (Communist) 
Party, but the “allied” parties had never taken an independent line. Just before these events, the 
government allowed the emergence of Fidesz (the Alliance of Young Democrats) as an open op-
position party, to be followed by several other opposition parties.54 The significance of these 
events was obscured because long-drawn-out “discussions” about electoral reform delayed the 
first free election until 1990, after Solidarnosc had taken power in Poland.55 These Hungarian 
developments, moreover, were overshadowed by the dramatic events then playing out in Tia-
nanmen Square in Beijing. Given the scant attention given these events, one is not surprised that 
few noticed that the Communist government in Hungary fell because of certain dams. 
The Danube River is the second longest in Europe (after the Volga). After dropping signifi-
cantly across southern Germany and Austria, it flattens out as it forms the border between Hun-
gary and Slovakia and spreads into three main channels that flow eastward across a broad flood 
plain, creating a network of islands and wetlands. These channels reunite at the Great Bend of 
the Danube after which it turns south to bisect Hungary. After falling 50 meters per 100 kilome-
ters in Austria, the river falls only 50 meters across its 417 km. (260 mi.) length in Hungary.56 
This is inadequate to support hydroelectric generation unless one or more large dams were built 
to create an artificial fall. The Communist governments in Czechoslovakia and Hungary dis-
cussed such a project for 25 years before signing a treaty in 1977 to construct a series of dams, 
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with the costs and the resulting electricity to be shared equally.57 Other claimed benefits included 
flood control, improved navigation, storage of fresh water for use during dry periods, enhanced 
recreational opportunities, and the ability to extract sand and gravel from the siltation of the res-
ervoirs.58 The plan called for construction of a dam at Dunakiliti in Hungary to “capture” the 
Danube. Virtually the entire flow of the Danube and several of its tributaries would then be di-
verted through a 17.5 km. (11 mi.) long elevated canal to a second dam and a 720 megawatt 
power plant at Gabčikovo in Slovakia. The canal, to lie atop mounded earth rising as much as 18 
m. (65 ft.) over the landscape, was to be lined with asphalt and plastic to prevent seepage. As a 
result, the flow of water in the natural channel would decline from 2,000 m3/sec. to less than 1 
m3/sec. A third dam was to be built about 100 km. (62 mi.) downstream from Gabčikovo at Na-
gymaros in Hungary, to generate another 158 megawatts while directing the flow back to the 
natural channel of the river. The plan was for most of the flow of the river to be stored in a large 
reservoir (covering 60 km2—24 mi2) at Dunakiliti, to be released to support peak power genera-
tion at Gabčikovo. Water was to be released twice a day to flush the canal, allow the turbines at 
Gabčikovo to generate electricity when it was most needed, and to return to the river at Nagyma-
ros in “12-ft. (4 m.) tidal waves.”59 
The Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project was never popular in Hungary, largely because of seri-
ous ecological and social ills that the project was expected to produce in Hungary.60 Unpopular-
ity rose when the Hungarian government proved unable to finance its share of the project and 
turned to Austria to provide the financing in exchange for the entire Hungarian share of the elec-
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tricity for 20 years. Among the problems (all of which would largely affect only Hungary or 
Hungarians) were the risks of earthquake induced flooding, a drop of the water table by about 7 
m. (22 ft.) that would dry up wells upon which farmers and villages had depended for centuries, 
and the drying of croplands and forests. Add to these, fears of pollution and disease from leach-
ing from the asphalt that would line the canals and reservoirs and an overall 25% decline of the 
fish population (and perhaps a 90% drop in the commercial fish harvest). Such problems were 
projected to affect about 2,000,000 people in Hungary (out of a population of 10,000,000). These 
problems would also affect about 1,000,000 people in Slovakia (out of a population of 
4,000,000).61 While the Hungary and Slovakia had together formed the core the Kingdom of 
Hungary before 1918, they had separate, troubled histories thereafter. After 1957, Hungary grad-
ually developed “Goulash Communism” that was a relatively mild single-party state, but Slova-
kia, in the wake of the “Prague Spring” of 1968 was, in 1989, under control of what arguably 
was the most repressive regime in Europe. Yet the repression so obvious in the Czech lands was 
considerably less in Slovakia.62 What perhaps accounts for the different reaction in the two coun-
tries was the fact that most people put at risk in Slovakia by the project were ethnic Hungarians 
who received scant sympathy from the majority Slovaks. 
With construction underway, Hungarians took to the streets and fields in 1985 to challenge 
the project on ecological grounds.63 This quickly evolved into an increasingly independent eco-
logical movement (Duna Kor: the Danube Circle), followed eventually by a peace group (Dia-
logus: Dialogue).64 By late 1988, as many as 60,000 people regularly rallied in the streets of Bu-
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dapest at the call of Duna Kor, the first open opposition to the Kadar regime since the shooting 
stopped in 1956.65 Civil disobedience swept the construction site, with sit-downs in front of bull-
dozers and the occupation of the canal and dam sites by demonstrators. Petitions against the pro-
ject collected 140,000 signatures, including signatures of 80 village mayors in the region to be 
affected. The protests quickly expanded to include demands for free elections, a revision of the 
“verdict” on 1956, support for the Hungarian minority in Romania, and, eventually, for the end 
of Communist rule.66 In April 1989, the Communist regime cracked. The government suspended 
the Hungarian part of the project (the Dunakiliti and Nagymaros complexes) despite threats by 
the Austrian and Czechoslovak governments to demand hundreds of millions of dollars in com-
pensation for breach of the treaty and the contracts.67 The suspension emboldened the demon-
strators. The “allied” parties abandoned the government, causing it to lose its parliamentary ma-
jority and collapse.68 This collapse immediately tilted the already on-going negotiations in Po-
land by a now demoralized government and an increasingly confident Solidarnosc.69 The Polish 
negotiations had started in February, but made little progress until the Hungarian government 
collapsed. Yet in Poland, with its well organized and active political opposition, no specific role 
can be assigned to environmental groups or concerns, although the increasingly evident envi-
ronmental failures of the government in Poland did tend to undermine its support.70  
                                                           
Evidence of any impact of the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project on the “Velvet Revolution” in 
Czechoslovakia is far less definite than in Hungary. Yet despite the more intense repression in 
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Czech regions after the “Prague Spring” of 1968, an underground petition against the project net-
ted 3,600 signatures in Prague in May 1989.71 Signers risked the sort of beatings, imprisonment, 
or worse, that had largely silenced “Charter 77”—one of the first “Helsinki Watch” groups. Open 
criticism of the dam was tolerated in the somewhat more open Slovak region.72 More generalized 
environmental concerns seem to have played a role in the Czech lands even if the project did 
not.73 Still, linking the “Velvet Revolution” directly to environmental concerns is more tenuous 
than for Hungary. Charter 77, led by Vaclav Havel, continued to speak out despite the repres-
sion, while the government’s failure to manage East German refugees flooding the West German 
embassy in Prague signaled a weakening of the regime.  
If the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project was not central in ending Communism in Czechoslo-
vakia, more generalized environmental concerns do seem to have played a role. Almost immedi-
ately after the “Velvet Revolution,” Havel described the environmental destruction as one of the 
most serious problems facing the new government.74 Serious observers have concluded that the 
Czech lands of Czechoslovakia were among the most environmentally damaged in Europe and 
had the most seriously polluted air on the continent.75 The Czech Ministry of the Environment 
furthermore attributed the loss of confidence in the regime that led to the “Velvet Revolution” to 
“the ecological crisis.”76 
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The new government in Czecho-Slovakia (as it was spelled after 1990) did not cancel the 
Gabčikovo-Nagymaros project,77 perhaps because its part of the project was already 90% com-
plete when the Hungarians sought to cancel it in October 1989.78 Yet if the project was not cen-
tral in ending Communism in Czechoslovakia, it did become central in the split of Czecho-
Slovakia in two. Despite the belated emergence of an environmental group that opposed the pro-
ject in Slovakia, Slovak leaders exploited fears of the Hungarians (inside the country as well as 
in Hungary) to build support for the dam as a nationalistic gesture, and then exploited that senti-
ment to break from Prague.79 Meanwhile, Austria extracted US$ 240,000,000 from Hungary as 
compensation for the breach of the electricity contracts (about three times as much as Austria 
had expended), money that then financed Slovakia’s unilateral completion of the Gabčikovo 
dam.80 The Slovak authorities re-designed the project to lie entirely within Slovakia. In Novem-
ber 1992, Slovakia “closed the river” and began to fill the reservoir, leading to on-going litiga-
tion before the International Court of Justice.81 
IV. MORE WALLS FALL: THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, BULGARIA, AND ALBANIA 
The Socialist Unity (Communist) Party and its German Democratic Republic had always 
appeared particularly vulnerable because the existence of the larger, non-Communist German 
Federal Republic provided an alternative model that was visibly more prosperous and that also, 
simply because of its greatly larger size, could claim to be “the real Germany.” As a result, the 
German Democratic Republic always practiced a more severe repression than most other Com-
munist regimes in Europe, a repression that prevented the emergence of even the mild dissidence 
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that characterized other Communist states in the 1970s and early 1980s.82 Yet as part of their 
struggle against West Germany and NATO, the German Communists did allow the emergence of 
ostensibly independent pacifist and environmentalist movements after 1981 that were intended to 
cooperate with their counterparts in western Germany.83 The Communists seemed to have over-
looked that influence could run both ways. 
No particular environmental crisis played a role in the collapse of the German Democratic 
Republic, but, as in Hungary, the Greens dominated the opposition and exploited popular discon-
tent to topple the government. The Greens were unable to build a new regime, so their successes 
against the Communists yielded a united and decidedly un-Green Germany. The East German 
pacifist and environmental groups were made up mostly of clergy and intellectuals. Because the 
Communists had worked hard to make such people marginal in society, they apparently did not 
fear that they could mobilize wide support should they escape control. When the government 
failed to prevent the flight of large numbers of people through the Hungarian border and the 
West German embassy in Prague,84 it lost control of the pacifist and green movements at home. 
Having had years of organizing experience, they now turned those skills against the government, 
leading demonstrations against the government (particularly in Leipzig). They founded a new 
organization (Neues Forum—the “New Forum”), which succeeded in crippling the government 
but was reluctant to replace the Communist regime. Neues Forum even opposed the opening of 
the Berlin Wall.85 Hesitancy by Neues Forum at the critical moment did not prevent the collapse 
of the Communist regime once Soviet President Gorbachev indicated that he would not allow the 
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Soviet Army to sustain the regime against its own people.86 Yet opponents of the Communists—
whether fleeing through Hungary or Prague, or streaming through the wall—seemed more inter-
ested in obtaining more goods and a better standard of living than in environmental issues.87 The 
first thing most East Berliners did when the wall opened was to go window shopping in West 
Berlin.  
Early projections that Neues Forum would sweep the interim elections in early 1990 proved 
false because of its organizational weaknesses and unpopular policy stands, particularly its 
choice to oppose German reunification in the hope of creating an alternative to both Communism 
and capitalism.88 The leaders of Neues Forum should have known which way the wind was 
blowing when their own crowds changed the chants from “Wir sind die Volk” (“We are the peo-
ple”) to “Wir sind ein Volk” (“We are one people”).89 The result of the collapse of Neues Forum 
in East Germany temporarily rendered the Greens politically insignificant in both parts of Ger-
many. The East German Greens won only two seats in the Bundestag in 1990, while the West 
German Greens lost all of their seats.90 
The story in Bulgaria is even more strongly centered on their “Greens” than is the story in 
Hungary or East Germany—but in a curious way. Before the middle of 1989, despite (or perhaps 
because of) the active persecution of ethnic Turks and Bogomils living in the country, Bulgaria 
seems to have lacked any active dissident movement, let alone significant opposition to the re-
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gime. Bulgaria was so quietly obedient to Moscow that it was sometimes called the “16th Repub-
lic” of the USSR.91 Then, quite suddenly, the government collapsed, entirely because of the gov-
ernment’s minimal toleration of an apparently tame environmental movement known as EkoG-
lasnost (Ecological Openness).92 This came about when the Bulgarian government hosted a 
three-week-long conference of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to discuss 
increased cooperation on the environment, particularly in light of Chernobyl.93 EkoGlasnost 
technically was an illegal organization, but the Bulgarian government did not pursue its mem-
bers. But when the meeting, ostensibly open to the public, began on October 15, 1989, the police 
barred members of EkoGlasnost from entering the building. The ensuing scuffles were witnessed 
by Western delegates to the meeting. On 27 October, 1989, the Bulgarian government apolo-
gized to the delegates and to EkoGlasnost.94 This apology touched off demonstrations against the 
government that led it to announce only two days later its intent to reform itself.95 As in other 
Communist states when they made similar announcements, this simply touched off greater pro-
tests until the capital, Sofia, was paralyzed.96 Unofficial trade unions, human rights groups, and 
political reform groups sprang up over night. Within a few days, Todor Zhivkov, long-time Sec-
retary-General of the party, resigned and the government recognized the legitimacy of EkoGlas-
nost.97 Bulgaria’s apparently stable Communist regime had collapsed like hollow shell.  
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Bringing down Communism in Albania took more time and did not immediately flow from 
the leadership of Green groups, but those emerged very early in the process. Albania’s Commu-
nists always employed one of the most repressive regimes in Europe and held on for a full year 
after most of the European Communist governments had fallen. Finally, on November 28, 1990, 
anti-Communist riots broke out in Elbasan, in southern Albania. Elbasan as the site of the riots 
was not fortuitous. It was the most heavily polluted industrial center in Albania, with heavy air 
and water pollution. One estimate is that as much of 10% of the cement produced in the town 
was released into the air.98 Plants producing chrome, coke, nickel, and steel in the city also pol-
luted its land, air, and water. The Elbasan riots led, two weeks later, to the formation of two in-
dependent parties—the Democratic Party (dedicated initially to protecting peasants’ interests, but 
quickly broadening out to represent intellectuals and industrial workers) and the Albanian Eco-
logical Party (founded in Elbasan and dedicated to addressing a growing ecological crisis).99 
This led to free elections in March of 1991, which brought a coalition of the Communists and the 
Democrats to power.100 The Albanian Ecology Party remained in opposition, charging that the 
Communists had “ruined the environment here more than in any other East European coun-
try.”101 The coalition government proved fragile, collapsing in December 1991, leading to ram-
pant lawlessness and further environmental degradation.102 The inability of the Albanian Eco-
logical Party to make an electoral impact led to the creation of an environmental activist group, 
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Perla.103 Perla, however, made only a small impact when Albania’s attention was diverted to the 
fights of compatriots for autonomy in Serbia (Kosovo) and Macedonia. 
V. WALLS TUMBLE FOR OTHER REASONS 
In Europe, only in Romania and Yugoslavia was blood shed in the overthrow of Commu-
nism. And only there did environmental concerns seem wholly irrelevant to that overthrow. Each 
followed its own somewhat different course. 
In Romania, the transition from Communism came about largely through an intraparty coup 
against the Ceauşescu regime that once started could not be stopped short of toppling of the 
Communists, in form if not in fact.104 The National Salvation Front, which was set up after the 
Ceauşescus were summarily executed, was, in fact, dominated by apparatchiki of the old re-
gime.105 Only gradually and fitfully did the government evolve towards democracy.106 Even 
Romania, however, was deeply influenced by the events in neighboring states, in nearly all 
which the changes were driven by environmental concerns to varying degrees.  
                                                           
Somewhat similarly, the Communist Party in the former Yugoslavia dissolved in power 
struggles over the succession to long-time dictator Josip Tito.107 The leaders of the constituent 
republics sought to exploit resurgent nationalism in order to strengthen and secure their posi-
tions. The Yugoslav Socialist Federation ended in a violent explosion of nationalism seemingly 
with connection with environmental concerns.  
Outside of Europe, the situation in Ethiopia was much like Romania and Yugoslavia—a vio-
lent fall, this time driven by years of civil and foreign war that seemed to have little to do with 
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environmental concerns.108 The failure of the Communist regime in Afghanistan seems to have 
resulted from pure nationalism, expressed religiously.109 These seemingly remote and disparate 
failures of Communism are not without significance to our main story. In particular, the Soviet 
failure in the Afghan war, coming only 3 years after Chernobyl, contributed significantly to the 
corrosion of public support for the Soviet government, particularly among the military, contribut-
ing to the collapse of that government. 
VI. WHY DID SO MUCH OF THE EDIFICE COLLAPSE? 
Environmental concerns certainly played a pivotal role in corroding and collapsing Commu-
nism, but they hardly explain everything about the collapse. I do not suggest a simple, determi-
nistic theory of environmental crises bringing down Communist (or perhaps other) authoritarian 
governments. There was a highly generalized disaffection with the regime, whether derived from 
frustrated consumerism, resurgent nationalism, or a real yearning for democracy and human 
rights.110 The willingness of the Red Army to turn against the Soviet regime in a failed coup af-
ter the disastrous war in Afghanistan also contributed to the fall. And the completely opposite 
roadmaps for reform followed in China and in the USSR and Eastern Europe perhaps contributed 
to the fall. None of this provides a fully satisfactory explanation, however. Inept governments 
have survived for decades or centuries until some precipitating event causes their demise. In the 
end much depends on how the mass of  the people interpret the crisis—an interpretation that the 
government itself can manipulate so long as it retains effective control over the flow of informa-
tion. Much also depends on the personality of leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev, no less than Louis 
                                                            
108 BAHRU ZEWDE, A HISTORY OF MODERN ETHIOPIA, 1855-1991 (2001). 
109 ARTYOM BOROVIK, THE HIDDEN WAR: A RUSSIAN JOURNALIST’S ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANI-
STAN (2001). 
110 Ash, supra note 4; Manur Olson, jr., Why the Transition from Communism Is So Difficult, 21 EASTERN ECON. 
J.437 (1995). 
XVI or Nikolai II, bears a heavy responsibility for the collapse of his system of government. 
Gorbachev was the first person to hold supreme power in the USSR since Lenin who had had a 
legal education, and he surrounded himself with others with legal educations (most of whom, 
like Gorbachev, had not actually worked as lawyers). So little attention has been to this feature 
that studies have been written about Gorbachev without mention of his legal training and legalis-
tic approach to crises.111 The impact of the legalistic mindset (the lawyer’s way of constructing 
reality, as it were) on the unraveling of these regimes would make an interesting case study,112 if 
only because the most conspicuous exception to the dissolution of Communist Party control 
(China) is the least legalistic culture of the lot.   
                                                           
As bad as environmental concerns have been (and continue to be) in Communist countries, 
people then and now seem able to tolerate an enormous amount of environment degradation even 
to the point of rising death rates so long as the degradation seems routine and highly generalized, 
dismissing it as part of the “natural background” within which humans work out their lives.113 
The collapse of Communist regimes shows, however, that when a dramatic event (a nuclear ac-
cident, a potentially disastrous dam) attributable to the government arises within this pattern of 
generalized degradation, it can galvanize hitherto diffused discontent against the government, so 
long as there is some minimal flow of information and some organized groups outside the effec-
tive control of the government. Shocks, rather than stresses, are the primary triggers of change. 
Governments can survive these challenges if the system is resilient. In other words, if the system 
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provides mechanisms for airing and responding to grievances, the more mechanisms the better. 
Or governments can survive if they can credibly blame the event on forces beyond its control 
(for example, natural forces) or if it is willing and able to repress opposition ruthlessly. Compare 
in this regard Gorbachev’s legalistic response and where it led to Deng Xiao Ping’s response to 
the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and where that led. When these conditions fail, gov-
ernments fall—or, at least, they lose elections.114  
Whether governments survive of fall, such shocks will produce inelegant solutions—
solutions that are messy and far from perfect. Nor was it inevitable that environmental concerns 
or environmentalist groups would form lever that would bring the walls of the Communist edi-
fice tumbling down. If there is a broad range of information flows and organizations operating 
within a society, people will find many reasons and avenues for opposing the government instead 
of just environmental concerns. When, as in the former Communist governments, environmental 
groups are the only even minimally tolerated forms of dissent or criticism, all (or nearly all) op-
ponents of the regime will gravitate to those groups and all critics will talk about the environ-
ment. In such a context, one should not be surprised that after the government falls, many who 
joined or supported the environmental groups proved to have little real commitment to ecological 
values and environmental concerns ended up far down on the list of the priorities of the new 
government.115 Thus, the non-Communist regimes in the former Communist states often have 
not committed much in the way of resources to cleaning up the environmental mess they inher-
ited from the Communists or even to correcting continuing or new sources of pollution.116 Even 
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the highly dangerous Soviet-era nuclear power plants, like that a Chernobyl, remained in opera-
tion for a considerable time, some even operating today.117 Chernobyl itself was not shut down 
until 2000, fourteen years after the accident and nearly a decade after the collapse of the 
USSR.118 In fact, whatever environmental improvements did occur, whether immediately after 
the collapse of the Communist regimes or at later over the last 20 years, seem to have resulted 
from declines in industrial production or other economic activity rather than because of envi-
ronment-friendly government policies.119 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
VII. WHAT REMAINS OF THE EDIFICE TODAY? 
The Communist Party in China did not fall, despite the events in Tiananmen Square in 
1989.120 In fact, the continuing survival of the authority of the Communist Party in China even 
while accepting a predominant role for a market economy may become a model for other au-
thoritarian regimes. Even the Russians, long loathe to concede primacy to the Chinese model, 
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have begun to study the possibility of emulating that model as they revive state authority over 
society and the economy.121  
China, of course, is hardly a testament to the durability of Communism, as opposed to the 
Communist Party—China is only nominally Communist. It is ruled by a Communist Party, but it 
is fully committed to a capitalist economy—without the checks and balances, ineffective as they 
sometimes are, that are built into democratic capitalist systems. The resulting rampant corruption 
is suggestive of the “robber barons” who dominated American capitalism a century earlier.122 
Environmental problems are among the most severe in the world and continue, as of this writing 
to worsen. This includes megaprojects like the Three Gorges Dam as well as rampant air and wa-
ter pollution, spreading desertification, and threatened resource exhaustion. 
The Three Gorges Dam itself was built, and caused even more severe environmental prob-
lems than were predicted in 1992.123 The failure to clean-up factories, mines, and towns flooded 
in the reservoir have made the reservoir into a cesspool of pollution rather than store of usable 
fresh water.124 Diseases like schistosomiasis are spreading as the waters rise in the reservoir.125 
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Rather than preventing downstream flooding, the impact of the dam has degraded the channel 
below the dam creating risks of even more serious flooding than before.126 Major historical and 
cultural assets have been flooded out with limited efforts to relocate them;127 in one instance, the 
local authorities responded to the flooding of historical artifacts by creating an “underwater mu-
seum” accessible by escalator.128 Endangered species are threatened with extinction because of 
the dam.129 Reports are circulating that other, smaller reservoirs may have triggered earth-
quakes,130 which, if true, create truly major worries about the Three Gorges project. Already 
nearly 1.3 million people have had to be relocated to make room for the dam and its reservoir 
according to official figures,131 and as many as 4 million more might have to be relocated be-
cause the water logging from the reservoir is causing the collapse of lands above the reservoir 
into its already polluted waters.132 The situation of the displaced people has been aptly described 
as “abysmal.”133 Nor are the benefits of the dam all that clear. While the dam unquestionably 
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generates vast amounts of electricity, it does not resolve country’s energy problems given the 
speed with which demand for energy is growing in China.134 What’s more, questions are being 
raised about the quality of construction in the dam: Its face exhibited cracks even before con-
struction was complete, and while these have been repaired, one cannot help but wonder about 
the reliability of the structure.135 Both the shoddy construction and the poorly implemented relo-
cation of former inhabitants of the region resulted in part from the pervasive corruption now 
found in China.136 
                                                           
In addition to the problems created by the Three Gorges project, China continues to destroy 
its environment to feed the ravenous appetite of its industries, particularly in the face of the glob-
al economic crisis.137 The air in many Chinese cities is simply poisonous.138 The air is so bad 
that breathing inside buildings in China is the greatest threat to public health.139 China actually 
succeeded in cleaning the air in Beijing for the Olympic Games in August 2008, only to see the 
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air deteriorate after the games.140 This had the effect of making it clear, however, that the pollu-
tion was not simply part of the “background noise” of life, forcing the government to invest in 
improving air quality, at least in Beijing.141 Just how this will play out over the country as a 
whole remains to be seen, and even in Beijing air quality remains poor.142 Meanwhile many 
other environmental problems remain largely unaddressed. 
                                                           
Attractive historic buildings are torn down with little or no compensation to the owners in 
order to clear land for highly polluting factories or expensive modern shops and houses.143 The 
north of China faces severe water shortages caused by pollution and overuse.144 The investing of 
vast sums in attempting to import water from a thousand kilometers or more away in central 
China has foundered on strong public resistance to the project prompted by ecological concerns 
causing multi-year delays in the project145—unlike the Three Gorges project where resistance 
had no impact.146 Elsewhere, entire public water supply systems have had to shut down in recent 
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years because of massive pollution of the source waters.147 China has become the major con-
tributor of greenhouse gases to climate disruption and will reap its reward from impending 
“mega-disasters.”148 In 2008, the government completely overhauled the structure of its envi-
ronmental regulatory agencies, ostensibly to better address the increasingly serious environ-
mental problems.149 Careful analysis, however, suggests that this reform still didn’t address the 
fundamental structural problems that have thus far ensured the environmental regulation has 
largely been ineffective.150 
That reports of severe environmental problems in China circulate despite efforts of the gov-
ernment to suppress them perhaps suggests that the government is losing control of the flow of 
information. Whether other conditions will combine with that information to undermine the gov-
ernment remains to be seen. The fact is that environmental concerns (whether conceived nar-
rowly in terms of pollution and ecological disruption or broadly in terms of the destruction of the 
built environment as well as the natural environment) are one of the driving forces behind the 
steadily rising incidence of “mass incidents”—anything from a modest protest to strikes to anti-
government riots—that has the government so alarmed.151 The government itself estimated there 
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were 87,000 mass incidents in 2005, more than 230 per day.152 It has not released a count since. 
The government is sufficiently concerned about the possibility of mass incidents escalating into 
chaos and disorder that it issued warnings to local governments to be especially vigilant in this 
year of multiple anniversaries (90 years after the “May 4 Movement”; 60 years after the found-
ing of the People’s Republic of China; 50 years after the “liberation” of Tibet; 20 years after the 
Tiananmen demonstrations).153 These concerns have resulted in increased repression against 
those who protest against environmental degradation.154 
Environmental non-governmental organizations have emerged in China, ranging from “or-
ganizations” consisting of a single individual activist to organizations sponsored and tightly con-
trolled by the government to diffused organizations of loosely connected networks of activists. 
All NGOs are required by law to be sponsored a government department or organization.155 
NGOs that lack such affiliation operate illegally, always at risk of arrest or other acts of suppres-
sion; with such affiliation, the groups are unable to operate as effective checks on the govern-
ment. Only some Chinese NGOs are focused on environmental issues, with others focusing on a 
broad range of issues, culminating in a manifesto—Charter 08, modeled after Charter 77 that 
help usher in the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia156—calling on the government to re-
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spect a broad range of freedoms, including the right to organize political parties to compete with 
the Communist Party of China.157 Charter 08 gained some 10,000 signatures online before the 
government banned its mention within China.158 
Activists have expressed hope that recent proposals to liberalize the oversight of NGOs 
working on AIDS would be extended to all NGOs.159 Instead the government increasingly has 
cracked down all forms of dissent, including simple petitioners who surfaced because of unful-
filled promises of opportunities for free expression at the Beijing Olympics.160 These would-be 
protesters were given relatively short sentences,161 but the organizers of Charter 08 faced a more 
uncertain future. At least the future remains uncertain for most of the authors of Charter 08.162 
For Liu Xiaobo, perhaps the leading organizer of the Charter 08 movement, however, the future 
is settled. He was held without trial for more than a year,163 and then, in a closed trial that lasted 
less than three hours, was sentenced to 11 years in prison on December 25, 2009.164 Others in-
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volved in Charter 08 have suffered as well, although not so dramatically.165 The message is clear 
to those who would criticize the government too aggressively.166 That message was perhaps ex-
pressed even more clearly by the doubling of total arrests for “endangering state security” be-
tween 2007 (742 arrests) and 2008 (1,712 arrests).167 
Notwithstanding the controls on environmental NGOs in the China, they have managed, of-
ten through the Internet or cell-phone texting, to coordinate resistance to activities that impose 
particularly egregious insults on the environment.168 There is even an emerging informal, yet 
somewhat effective, movement concerned about global climate disruption.169 Several of these 
organizations are focused precisely on the problems created by the Three Gorges Dam.170 The 
government continues to seek to control or suppress all organizations involved in active protests 
or other mass incidents, and particularly to control their access to funds.171 The government har-
asses, disbars, beats, or arrests lawyers who seek to use the courts to challenge these wrongs.172 
And the police turn even more frequently to violence to suppress mass incidents.173 These pres-
sures often lead to self-censorship. Whether the environmental or other organizations can, or 
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will, perform the role in China that they did in so many of the formerly Communist countries, 
remains to be seen. 
Looking around the world, we find several other nominally Communist systems (Cuba, 
Laos, and Vietnam) that have largely followed the Chinese path, and several proto-Marxist re-
gimes (Bolivia, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) that may go down the classic Leninist-
Stalinist-Maoist path or take the modern Chinese path. Only North Korea is reputed to be a clas-
sic Communist state,174 and even there an informal market economy has grown up because of the 
state’s failure to manage the economy with minimal effectiveness.175 That market economy has 
become so robust that it employs half of North Korea’s 23.5 million people and provides 80 per-
cent of household incomes.176 The government’s response has been an attempt, in December 
2009, to suppress the burgeoning free markets, an attempt that has produced the first large-scale 
public resistance to the regime.177 North Korea, moreover, is an environmental and economic 
basket case.178 It may be that all political-economic systems, whether classically Communist, 
capitalist, or following some “third way,” will end up like North Korea if we do not constrain our 
excesses,179 but there is still something to be said for getting their more slowly than classic 
Communism seems to. And that is perhaps the reason that classic Communism collapsed. 
                                                            
174 See, e.g., MIKE KIM, ESCAPING NORTH KOREA: DEFIANCE AND HOPE IN THE WORLD’S MOST REPRESSIVE REGIME 
(2008). 
175 See ANDREI LANKOV, NORTH OF THE DMZ: ESSAYS ON DAILY LIFE IN NORTH KOREA (2007). 
176 Blaine Hardin, In North Korea, a Strong Movement Recoils at Kim Jong Il’s Attempt to Limit Wealth, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 27, 2009, at A16. 
177 Id. 
178 See, e.g., Blaine Harden, Inflation-Hit North Korea Has Fired Top Economic Officials, South’s Media Report, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2010, at A8; Blaine Harden, N. Korea Currency Crackdown Fuels Inflation, Food Shortages, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2010, at A11; Blaine Harden, North Korea Revalues Currency, Destroying Personal Savings, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2009, at A8; Blaine Harden, This Time, Promises Alone May Not Feed North Korea, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 19, 2009, at A10. See generally Sangmin Nam, The Legal Development of the Environmental Policy in 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1322 (2004). 
179 See JAMES K. GALBRAITH, PREDATOR STATE: HOW CONSERVATIVES ABANDONED THE FREE MARKET AND WHY 
LIBERALS SHOULD TOO (2008). 
